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CHIEF LEGAL OFFICER 5.0
Omari Scott Simmons*
INTRODUCTION
The contemporary business environment requires an enhanced chief legal
officer (CLO) role. Since the Great Recession of 2008, the demands placed
on CLOs have increased.1 Today’s business environment is characterized by
technological disruption, increased activism by shareholders and other
stakeholders, a regulatory environment emphasizing internal controls, and
private ordering instead of prescriptive regulation. At the same time, delivery
methods in the legal services industry are undergoing a massive
transformation,2 driven in part by technological innovation. If handled
ineffectively, these complex demands threaten corporate value.
The enhanced CLO role is an element of a corporate immune system,
which “is a collection of internal processes and mechanisms that have been
developed to protect corporations by identifying and eradicating threats to
their economic value,” such as managerial shirking and opportunism.3 Other
elements of the corporate immune system often include, inter alia, board
oversight, compliance and risk management systems, and remuneration.4 In
a sense, modern CLOs perform “an embedded internal regulatory function,”5
which includes “monitoring, formulating company procedures and policies,

* Howard L. Oleck Professor of Business Law and Director of Business Law Program, Wake
Forest University School of Law. This Essay was prepared for the Colloquium on Corporate
Lawyers, hosted by the Fordham Law Review and the Stein Center for Law and Ethics on
October 11, 2019, at Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank all participants
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Cathy Hwang, Eli Wald, Andrew Kent, Miriam Baer, Donald Langevoort, Sean Griffith, Sung
Hui Kim, David Yosifon, Russell Pearce, and Bernice Grant. I would also like to thank Mary
Susan Lucas, Ellen Murphy, Steve Nickles, Brian Lewis, Ryan Gee, and Lanie Summerlin for
their valuable assistance. Finally, I would like to give special thanks to the Fordham Law
Review, Thomas L. Sager, and Veta C. Richardson.
1. See ASS’N OF CORP. COUNSEL, 2019 ACC CHIEF LEGAL OFFICERS SURVEY 2–7 (2019),
https://www.acc.com/sites/default/files/resources/upload/2019-ACC-Chief-Legal-OfficersSurvey.pdf [https://perma.cc/5PEY-QFCQ].
2. See George P. Baker & Rachel Parkin, The Changing Structure of the Legal Services
Industry and the Careers of Lawyers, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1635, 1637 (2006).
3. Omari Scott Simmons, The Corporate Immune System: Governance from the Inside
out, 2013 ILL. L. REV. 1131, 1136.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1144.
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and enforcement.”6 As another advantage, “[t]his internal regulatory
function [arguably] lowers the monitoring costs for government actors.”7
The CLO role falls within the monitoring model of corporate governance
that has become the favored policy response to economic turmoil and
contemporary scandals.8 The monitoring model emphasizes procedures,
internal controls, compliance, and risk management “as tools to address
agency costs [i.e., transaction costs], particularly problems of asymmetric
information and managerial opportunism.”9 The modern CLO role is best
expressed in terms of value creation,10 a “dynamic concept involving the
interaction of multiple parties and activities in the employment of corporate
resources.”11 In-house counsel value is not simply limited to individual
value-producing activities. “[I]t also encompasses the networked and
embedded nature of the role, which contributes to the enhancement of
corporate value and competitive advantage in unique ways that outside
counsel cannot easily replicate.”12
The CLO role is inherently strategic rather than tactical.13 It involves
consistent interaction with corporate operations and a multiplicity of actors,
enabling the corporation to significantly enhance its creation and
preservation of value.14 Generally, CLOs’ fiduciary obligations and
6. Omari Scott Simmons & James D. Dinnage, Innkeepers: A Unifying Theory of the InHouse Role, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 77, 138 (2011).
7. Id.; see also Miriam Hechler Baer, Corporate Policing and Corporate Governance:
What Can We Learn from Hewlett-Packard’s Pretexting Scandal, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 523,
547–48 (2008) (explaining that the government, through policies and regulations, has
encouraged companies to have higher ethical standards as well as effective compliance
programs).
8. Simmons, supra note 3, at 1144.
9. Id. at 1145.
10. There are numerous formulations of the value-creation concept in the business
literature. See, e.g., TIM HINDLE, GUIDE TO MANAGEMENT IDEAS AND GURUS 201–02 (2008).
These issues elicit considerable debate on what metrics are the best proxies for corporate value
(e.g., stock price, accounting or book value, net present value of future cash flows). Id. For
example, financial experts may focus on metrics such as share price or book value as a proxies
for value, whereas marketers may rely on more intangible measures, such as perceived
customer value above cost. Id. Legal observers such as Ronald Gilson have also applied the
value-creation concept to business lawyers. Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business
Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 243 (1985); see also Steven L.
Schwarcz, To Make or to Buy: In-House Lawyering and Value Creation, 33 J. CORP. L. 497,
498 (2008).
11. Simmons & Dinnage, supra note 6, at 84.
12. Id. Most definitions of business lawyer value creation in the legal literature, although
useful, are descriptively too narrow because (1) they are limited to transactional sources of
value; (2) they are fragmented; or (3) they fail to capture the unique value that stems from inhouse counsel linkages, networks, and integration with other firm activities. Id. at 110 (“By
contrast, our theory is not limited to transactions as traditionally envisioned, but also
encompasses intangible and non-transactional sources of value, such as corporate compliance,
which help directors and officers fulfill their oversight duties.”).
13. Id. at 84–85 (“When completed by competent professionals with well-honed ethical
sensibilities, the strategic tasks that in-house counsel undertake add value because they are
fundamentally different from the largely tactical outside law firm role.”).
14. Id. at 83 (“Examples such as failure to comply with a federal regulation, a poorly
written supply contract, or a mishandled product lawsuit, all constitute a threat to corporate
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representation serve, in the following order: (1) the corporation, (2) the chief
executive officer (CEO), and (3) everyone else.15 This order of priority is
especially important where conflict arises. CLOs are both leaders and
lawyers, and must continuously navigate the tension between these
responsibilities. Simply being a highly proficient tactical lawyer is
insufficient.16 CLOs, leading an entire legal department and sometimes
having other corporate functions, are charged with ensuring that corporate
clients receive quality advice on an ongoing basis.
Given the fast pace and growing complexity of the financially focused
business environment, the CLO must creatively and intelligently engage
internal clients and a range of third parties, which requires a diverse and
deeper set of competencies. The CLO of the future should have a skill set
that resembles a T shape.17 Here, the vertical line represents acute legal
acumen and the horizontal line represents additional competencies that allow
the CLO to bridge multiple constituencies. Specifically, these additional
competencies include, inter alia, (1) sophisticated procurement capabilities,
(2) an enhanced financial focus, and (3) a global enterprise risk-management

value. Prudent corporate managers cannot wait until such threats materialize; they require a
type of consistent and strategic guidance that in-house counsel are uniquely positioned to
provide.”). CLOs mitigate threats to corporate value as well as proactively capture
opportunities. Id. Value can be both tangible and intangible and the particular metric for value
may vary depending on the context or particular vantage point. Id.
15. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018); E.
Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, The Tensions, Stresses, and Professional
Responsibilities of the Lawyer for the Corporation, 62 BUS. LAW. 1, 8–13 (2006) (explaining
that tensions may arise because of in-house counsel’s relationship with corporate management
and in spite of these tensions in-house counsel “must exercise independent judgment on behalf
of the corporate client when advising directors, officers, and employees of the client”); see
also Gillian Tett, Does Capitalism Need Saving from Itself?, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2019),
https://www.ft.com/content/b35342fe-cda4-11e9-99a4-b5ded7a7fe3f
[https://perma.cc/
4WZ2-EGNN]; Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose of a Corporation to Promote ‘An
Economy That Serves All Americans,’ BUS. ROUNDTABLE (Aug. 19, 2019),
https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtable-redefines-the-purpose-of-acorporation-to-promote-an-economy-that-serves-all-americans
[https://perma.cc/X992XPE3] [hereinafter Business Roundtable].
16. A CLO has to create an environment of collaboration, support, and teamwork as
opposed to an insecure environment caused when the CLO’s words do not parallel action.
Interview with Thomas L. Sager, Former Exec. Vice President & Gen. Counsel of DuPont
(Aug. 14, 2019). Additionally, a CLO who overemphasizes CEO- and board-oriented
activities at the expense of other corporate constituencies may prove ineffective. Id.; see also
Ben G. Pender II, Note, Invigorating the Role of the In-House Legal Advisor as Steward in
Ethical Culture and Governance at Client-Business Organizations: From 21st Century
Failures to True Calling, 12 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 91, 96 (2009) (“Although many business
organizations frame and articulate corporate conscience through written policies, ethics codes,
and compliance management programs, policies, codes, and compliance programs alone are
inadequate to operationalize an ethical corporate conscience.”).
17. See R. Amani Smathers, The 21st-Century T-shaped Lawyer, LAW PRAC., July/Aug.
2014, at 32; see also Scott F. Norberg, Summary of the Proceedings, 13 FLA. INT’L U. L. REV.
313, 332 (2019) (summarizing the remarks of Fernando Garcia, general counsel and
government affairs and corporate secretary of Nissan Canada). See generally ELAINE MAK,
THE T-SHAPED LAWYER AND BEYOND: RETHINKING LEGAL PROFESSIONALISM AND LEGAL
EDUCATION FOR CONTEMPORARY SOCIETIES (2017).
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orientation.18 Performing this enhanced role, however, may be subject to
challenges and limitations.
This Essay builds upon the business-lawyer value-creation literature by
analyzing the contemporary CLO and argues for an enhanced CLO role.19 It
emphasizes the sometimes ignored and underemphasized demand-side
considerations involved in the provision of legal services. These demandside considerations will help to predict the competencies and expanded skill
sets CLOs will need to navigate the challenging contemporary business
environment. Part I of this Essay discusses CLOs’ sophisticated purchasing
competencies. It explores how CLOs have revolutionized legal service
provision by addressing problems stemming from information asymmetries
between the client corporation and external legal service providers. Part II
examines how the contemporary CLO role is more financially focused,
placing greater demands on legal departments to articulate their value to
corporate managers. Part III explores the importance of global enterprise risk
management and the impact CLOs can have in capturing and preserving
economic value. Part IV addresses potential challenges and concerns related
to the proposed enhanced CLO role. The Essay concludes that the
contemporary business environment facing global companies requires an
enhanced CLO role reflecting a broader range of competencies. As a matter
of prediction and aspiration, it maps out key competencies contemporary
CLOs should possess.
I. SOPHISTICATED PURCHASING COMPETENCIES
CLOs function as sophisticated purchasers who help companies make a
key decision: whether to make or buy legal services.20 If they opt for the
latter, questions arise as to which external service provider(s) to use and for
which types of matters.

18. Jena McGregor, Group of Top CEOs Says Maximizing Shareholder Profits No Longer
Can Be the Primary Goal of Corporations, WASH. POST (Aug. 19, 2019, 6:18 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/08/19/lobbying-group-powerful-ceos-isrethinking-how-it-defines-corporations-purpose/ [https://perma.cc/RA3S-LFG7].
19. This Essay often uses “CLO” as a proxy for the entire corporate legal department. See
generally Gilson, supra note 10, at 243 (“If what a business lawyer does has value, a
transaction must be worth more, net of legal fees, as a result of the lawyer’s participation.”
(emphasis omitted)); Schwarcz, supra note 10, at 498.
20. See generally R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937)
(asserting that, in order to minimize transaction costs, it may be optimal to bring various labor
functions within the firm to prevent costly “spot” labor market transactions); Oliver E.
Williamson, The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations, 61 AM.
ECON. REV. 112 (1971) (analyzing the benefits of internalization versus external
procurement); Corporations Are Adding to Their In-House Legal Departments, Cutting
Outside Expenditures, A.B.A. J. (Dec. 1, 2014, 5:00 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/
magazine/article/corporations_are_adding_to_their_in_house_legal_departments_cutting_ou
tside [https://perma.cc/9L2T-ACDU] (“Large corporations worldwide switched their 2013
legal spending from outside law firms to in-house law departments.”).
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A. Nature of Legal Services: Experience and Credence Characteristics
The value of legal services is a function of cost and quality.21 Whereas
cost is relatively transparent from service provider invoices, quality is often
more difficult to discern. Economists identify three types of goods: (1)
search goods, (2) experience goods, and (3) credence goods.22 In the search
goods context, the search process prior to consumption readily reveals the
quality of the goods.23 Search goods have “low pre-buying costs of quality
detection.”24 On the other hand, the quality of experience goods cannot be
discerned during the search process but only during or after consumption.25
These goods have “high pre-buying costs of quality detection” but low postbuying costs of quality detection.26 Examples include many jobs, movies,
newspapers, wine, and food.27 The quality of credence services—such as
certain medical services, automobile repairs, and education—cannot fully be
determined after the search process and even following a significant period
after consumption.28 They have “high pre-buying costs and high post-buying
costs of quality detection.”29
Legal services most closely reflect experience and credence services,
making the client corporation vulnerable to the opportunistic behavior of
service providers seeking to extract higher profits or rents.30 If the services
are experience services, their quality can be detected earlier than that of
credence services; that is, during or immediately after use.31 Nonetheless,
the client company may still fall prey to opportunistic behavior; for example,
if the service provider is not interested in repeat business and tries to extract
a hefty “one-off” premium. However, the risk of losing future business may
constrain and discipline the conduct of many service providers.32
21. See Simmons & Dinnage, supra note 6, at 106–07.
22. Victor Fleischer, Brand New Deal: The Branding Effect of Corporate Deal
Structures, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1581, 1600 (2006) (listing the three types of goods); see also
Michael R. Darby & Edi Karni, Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud, 16 J.L.
& ECON. 67, 68–69 (1973); Philip Nelson, Information and Consumer Behavior, 78 J. POL.
ECON. 311, 311 (1970).
23. Fleischer, supra note 22, at 1600. The quality of search goods, such as clothing,
footwear, and jewelry, can readily be discerned during the search process prior to
consumption. Id.
24. MEN-ANDRI BENZ, STRATEGIES IN MARKETS FOR EXPERIENCE AND CREDENCE GOODS
2 (2007); see also Nelson, supra note 22, at 311 (analyzing consumer behavior with respect
to search and experience goods).
25. See Darby & Karni, supra note 22, at 68.
26. BENZ, supra note 24, at 2.
27. Id.
28. See Darby & Karni, supra note 22, at 68–69 (“Credence qualities are those which,
although worthwhile, cannot be evaluated in normal use.”).
29. BENZ, supra note 24, at 2.
30. Id.; see also Nelson, supra note 22, at 311 (analyzing consumer behavior with respect
to search and experience goods). On the other hand, the quality of experience goods is not
discernable during the search process but rather after consumption. See Darby & Karni, supra
note 22, at 80.
31. Fleischer, supra note 22, at 1600.
32. See Darby & Karni, supra note 22, at 68 (explaining that the profits of many
businesses depend on client relationships, which are “implicit understanding[s] that the
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Credence services expose an even greater asymmetry between buyers and
sellers concerning knowledge about quality.33 In the legal services context,
quality will be difficult to determine or require costly information and other
circumstances;34 for example, a considerable time lapse.35 Credence
characteristics create two types of asymmetry based on customers’ inabilities
to determine their needs or accurately diagnose a problem and the level of
service necessary.36 By controlling the interplay between diagnosis and
service provision, the service provider can exacerbate the customer’s
dilemma because “consumer ignorance and [the] additional cost of separate
diagnosis and repair provide motivation [or incentives] for a service firm to
defraud its customers.”37 The veracity risk is higher when “information may
be filtered and possibly distorted to the advantage of the [service] firm that
has assumed the information collection responsibility.”38 A broader range of
overreaching service provider conduct falling short of fraud is still
problematic; for example, inferior work product and lack of punctuality may
still work to the detriment of the corporate client.
In the legal services context, CLOs can disrupt service provider overreach
and opportunism in several ways. As sophisticated purchasers within the
corporation, they can help to mitigate information gaps associated with
experience and credence services.39 Their embedded legal acumen enables
them to help diagnose problems and, equipped with data-driven tools, they
can collect and analyze reliable information about the proposed service,
thereby creating more value for their companies.40 For example, a data
analysis of contracts might reveal costly errors and gaps for which the service
provider bears responsibility. Similarly, data analytics might reveal that a
law firm’s recommended litigation strategy has not generated desirable
results commensurate with its costs. CLOs’ guidance is not simply ex post;
they can provide valuable predictive guidance to assist ex ante decisionmaking.41

customer will return for future services so long as he does not detect fraud or low quality
services.”).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See id. at 69.
36. See Brian Roe & Ian Sheldon, Credence Good Labeling: The Efficiency and
Distributional Implications of Several Policy Approaches, 89 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 1020, 1020
n.1 (2007) (“[O]nly an expert can diagnose the consumer’s true needs, e.g., does the car need
a minor or major repair? . . . [O]nly the seller may know the level of service actually provided,
e.g., was the car given the appropriate level of service?”).
37. Darby & Karni, supra note 22, at 77.
38. Williamson, supra note 20, at 120.
39. Simmons & Dinnage, supra note 6, at 108–09.
40. Rebecca M. Lamberth et al., Alternative Fee Arrangements: Who’s Responsible for
Making Them Work?, 22 CAL. LITIG., no. 2, 2009, at 11, 14–15.
41. See Simmons & Dinnage, supra note 6, at 108. With access to internal control
mechanisms as well as ongoing internal relationships, in-house counsel can gather information
more efficiently and at a lower cost, allowing them to conduct more precise ex ante and ex
post evaluations of corporate legal performance. Otherwise, the external acquisition of this
information could be costly and increase veracity risks, where “information may be filtered
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B. Bundling
CLOs must also be attuned to the issue of service provider bundling.
Bundling involves a single service provider performing a range of
differentiated tasks for a single client.42 At first, bundling services can seem
to be a win-win proposition for both customer and service provider.43 For
the corporate customer, purchasing bundled services can save money.
Bundling, in essence, offers a volume discount, where the corporate customer
gets more product or services at a lower per-unit cost.44 For the seller or
service provider, bundling is a way to generate additional revenue.45 The
efficacy of the standard “Costco” volume discount, involving a single
product, hinges on buyers’ actual need for more product or service.46
Similarly, cable television customers may continually pay for access to
hundreds of channels they do not watch.47
When service providers offer corporate clients a bundle of differentiated
professional services rather than a standard volume discount—that is, various
products versus more of the same product—the potential for information
asymmetries and service provider overreach increase.48 Thus, bundling,
involving differentiated services, requires greater sophistication and
monitoring prowess. Beyond the primary service offering, ancillary bundled
services must provide additional value to the customer; otherwise, they are
as superfluous and wasteful as surplus services provided at a standard volume
discount. However, in the bundled context, monitoring and discerning value
across a range of differentiated services can be more complex and
burdensome, and bundling can also significantly increase the corporate
customer’s switching costs.49
As sophisticated purchasers of legal services, CLOs are crucial in
diagnosing the legal issues; determining what type, level, and mix of services
and possibly distorted to the advantage of the [third party service] firm that has assumed the
information collection responsibility.” Id.
42. Lamberth et al., supra note 40, at 14–15.
43. Id.
44. Vanessa Page, How Costco Makes Money, INVESTOPEDIA (Dec. 13, 2018),
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/070715/costcos-business-model-smarteryou-think.asp [https://perma.cc/KSG9-3BAD].
45. Lamberth et al., supra note 40, at 14–15.
46. Brad Tuttle, Costco Is Facing a Looming, Bulk-Sized Problem, TIME (Mar. 10, 2014),
https://time.com/18671/costco-is-facing-a-looming-bulk-sized-problem/ [https://perma.cc/
6CQT-CU4H].
47. Jonathan Berr, Why Americans Are Watching Fewer TV Channels, FORBES (July 31,
2019, 10:00 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jonathanberr/2019/07/31/why-americans-arewatching-fewer-tv-channels [https://perma.cc/S2K3-BUUE] (describing how “the average
TV household had access to nearly 200 channels” in 2018, but only watched an average of
12.7 channels).
48. Toby Brown, Pricing Legal Services: Alternative Fee Arrangements, ADVOCATE,
Winter 2017, at 31, 32–33 (explaining that true cost savings, as opposed to a discount, require
general counsels to “engage in planning, scoping, and budgeting”).
49. Patrick Greenlee et al., An Antitrust Analysis of Bundled Loyalty Discounts, 26 INT’L
J. INDUS. ORG. 1132, 1134 (2008) (“Employing a bundled loyalty discount imposes switching
costs on customers because a customer that shifts some purchases to a rival seller pays a higher
unit price for the quantity still purchased from the incumbent.”).
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are needed; deciding whether to provide them in-house or procure them from
Technological
an external provider; and analyzing their value.50
advancements in data collection have made in-house analysis and
measurement of service provision more effective.51 Consequently, the power
dynamic between the corporate client and external legal service provider can
be significantly altered to the client’s benefit.52
C. Disintermediation
Today, companies are eschewing intermediaries and external service
providers in a number of areas. Disintermediation53—that is, eliminating
middlemen—may be desirable where in-house counsel can perform work
previously provided by external law and other service firms.54 Technological
advances, particularly in the artificial intelligence (AI) arena (e.g., machine
learning), are displacing lawyers and changing legal service delivery

50. Simmons & Dinnage, supra note 6, at 107–10.
51. Reena SenGupta, Tech, Data, and Compliance Are Converging to Transform
Business, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/d3cba350-d845-11e8a854-33d6f82e62f8 [https://perma.cc/RFV9-MVBX] (“[L]egal and compliance data touch so
many parts of a business that collecting, harmonising and analysing it yields useful insights
about vendors, customers and staff.”).
52. Ronald J. Gilson, The Devolution of the Legal Profession: A Demand Side
Perspective, 49 MD. L. REV. 869, 902–03 (1990) (explaining how a corporation can generally
save money by internalizing legal services instead of hiring outside counsel). Gilson
comments on the shift in power between the client corporation and external legal providers.
Id. (“As Robert Mnookin and I stated four years ago, ‘[g]eneral counsel for major corporations
are creating a revolution and are the primary agents of change.’ Increasingly, general counsel
are former partners in large corporate firms who are capable of internalizing both the
diagnostic and referral functions they previously performed on behalf of clients as outside
counsel. The critical difference is that internalizing these functions eliminates the information
asymmetry between client and lawyer, so that no relationship specific assets are created and
no lock-in effect results. The consequence is a dramatic reduction in the switching costs facing
clients and an elimination of lawyers’ market power.”).
53. See MCKINSEY GLOB. INST., THE FUTURE OF WORK IN AMERICA: PEOPLE AND PLACES,
TODAY AND TOMORROW 99 (2019), https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/
Featured%20Insights/Future%20of%20Organizations/The%20future%20of%20work%20in
%20America%20People%20and%20places%20today%20and%20tomorrow/The-Future-ofWork-in-America-Full-Report.ashx [https://perma.cc/2QFU-N5CX] (predicting that
automation and AI could replace 23 percent of all lawyers); Andrew L. Shapiro, Digital
Middlemen and the Architecture of Electronic Commerce, 24 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 795, 798 n.8
(1998) (predicting disintermediation’s effect on the legal profession, where lawyers are
middlemen between information and the clients); cf. Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97
GEO. L.J. 193, 200 (2008) (explaining disintermediation’s role in “enabling companies to
access the ultimate source of funds, the capital markets, without going through banks or other
financial intermediaries”).
See generally Tom C. W. Lin, Infinite Financial
Disintermediation, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 643 (2015) (discussing disintermediation in the
financial industry).
54. Sarah Kellogg, The Uncertain Future: Turbulence and Change in the Legal
Profession, 30 WASH. LAW. 18, 21 (2016) (explaining that 67 percent of law firms surveyed
in 2016 stated they were “currently losing business to corporate law departments that are insourcing legal work”).
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methods.55 Just as the law firm convergence movement employed strategies
to reduce the number of external service providers and thus reduce costs and
improve the quality of service,56 the implementation of AI technology
foreshadows another major shift in service delivery.57 This shift inevitably
will impact the number of external as well as in-house lawyers needed to
serve corporate client needs. But most importantly, AI frees lawyers up to
spend more time on productive, value-producing activities. Instead of
routine tasks, the modern CLO can spend more time collaborating with
business partners on strategic issues than their historical counterparts could.58
Equipped with useful data and a more strategic orientation, the modern CLO
can better engage the board and C-suite executives, bridging historical
silos.59
D. Expansive View of Legal Services
In the contemporary context, CLOs should adopt a more expansive view
of corporate service needs and acquisition options, rather than a narrow
traditional focus on legal services alone. From a company’s demand-side
perspective, legal services are quite similar to other types of professional
services. Today’s legal service providers are not limited to law firms but
include the “Big Four” accounting firms—PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC),
Deloitte, Ernst & Young (EY), and KPMG—and legal tech companies.60
The alternative legal service provider (ALSP) market represented an
estimated $10.7 billion in 2017 revenue and is increasing at an annual rate of
nearly 13 percent.61 The ALSP industry can be divided into five segments:
55. Jane Croft, The Relentless Advance of the Super-Intelligent Attorney, FIN. TIMES (Dec.
5, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/af3e2a64-a069-11e6-891e-abe238dee8e2 [https://
perma.cc/MW69-VJ6P].
56. See generally THE NEW REALITY: TURNING RISK INTO OPPORTUNITY THROUGH THE
DUPONT LEGAL MODEL 2 (Silvio J. Decarli & Andrew L. Schaeffer eds., 5th ed. 2009)
[hereinafter NEW REALITY].
57. Croft, supra note 55.
58. Richard Susskind, the world’s most cited author on the future of legal services,
provides a clear illustration of the changing legal landscape. See Bloomberg Law, How A.I.
Will Excel at Legal Work, YOUTUBE (May 24, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qec14tbNVg [https://perma.cc/F7WX-5S5J]; see also Julie Sobowale, How Artificial
Intelligence Is Transforming the Legal Profession, A.B.A. J. (Apr. 1, 2016), http://
www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/how_artificial_intelligence_is_transforming_the_lega
l_profession [https://perma.cc/K2NM-9FYL] (discussing how technology automates tedious,
low-value tasks and allows lawyers to devote more time to high-value, analytical tasks).
59. See Sterling Miller, Artificial Intelligence and Its Impact on Legal Technology: To
Boldly Go Where No Legal Department Has Gone Before, THOMSON REUTERS (“As CEOs and
CFOs become more accustomed to using AI, they will expect the other members of the CSuite—including the general counsel and legal department—to follow suit. In-house lawyers
that embrace AI, will become more valuable to the next generation of CEOs and CFOs.”) (last
visited Mar. 17, 2020).
60. David B. Wilkins & Maria J. Esteban Ferrer, The Integration of Law into Global
Business Solutions: The Rise, Transformation, and Potential Future of the Big Four
Accountancy Networks in the Global Legal Services Market, 43 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 981,
982 (2018).
61. THOMSON REUTERS, ALTERNATIVE LEGAL SERVICE PROVIDERS 2019: FAST GROWTH,
EXPANING USE AND INCREASING OPPORTUNITY 3 (2019), https://legal.thomsonreuters.com/
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the Big Four ($1.2 billion), captive legal process outsourcers (LPOs) ($300
million), independent LPOs ($7.4 billion), managed services ($700 million),
and contract and staffing services ($1.1 billion).62
The Big Four accounting firms, subject to ethics and local bar rules, are
already supplanting law firms in the tax advisory space and beyond.63
Typically, they have strong, and sometimes “cozy,” C-suite connections with
chief financial officers (CFOs) and corporate finance departments as well as
relationships with fraud and investigative units.64 They generally categorize
their practices as audit and non-audit.65 The obvious driver of this division
is the risk of conflicts, as well as the perception of conflicts.66 Despite a
modest legal presence in the United States, they are arguably the world’s
largest law firms,67 employing armies of lawyers in Latin America, Europe,
the Middle East, Asia, and Africa.68
The work of the Big Four and traditional law firms is generally
distinguished as lower-cost, high-volume work versus more strategic, highercost, low-volume work.69 Examples of the former include compliance, data
privacy, and labor law work.70 The latter might include high-level board
advice; for example, defending a shareholder fiduciary duty lawsuit.
Notably, the Big Four often have direct control over a team of full-time
lawyers who are not outsourced or contract talent.71 Their vertical
integration allows them to provide one-stop solutions for major corporate

content/dam/ewp-m/documents/legal/en/pdf/reports/alsp-report-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/
7J2T-Y2XN] [hereinafter ALSP REPORT].
62. Id.
63. Wilkins & Ferrer, supra note 60, at 982.
64. Id.; see also ALSP REPORT, supra note 61, at 4; Interview with Big Four Accounting
Principal (Aug. 27, 2019).
65. Wilkins & Ferrer, supra note 60, at 997 (“[T]he real growth in the development of
each of the Big Four’s legal networks has come from their ability to sell legal services to the
vast majority of companies around the world that are not their audit clients.”).
66. Id. at 997–98.
67. John Fitzgerald, The Big 4: An Existential Threat to Law Firms?, LAW.COM (Mar. 18,
2019, 12:00 PM), https://www.law.com/mid-market-report/2019/03/18/the-big-4-anexistential-threat-to-law-firms/ [https://perma.cc/4XT6-UAVR] (“PwC Legal had already
become the world’s sixth largest legal services provider, by headcount, in 2017. Indeed,
between them, the Big 4 average well over 2,200 lawyers in 72 countries.”).
68. Jonathan Derbyshire, Big Four Circle the Legal Profession, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 15,
2018),
https://www.ft.com/content/9b1fdab2-cd3c-11e8-8d0b-a6539b949662
[https://
perma.cc/X4N9-DVBP] (“PwC employs 3,600 lawyers in 98 countries; EY has 2,200 lawyers
in 81 countries; KPMG about 1,800 lawyers in 75 jurisdictions; and Deloitte has more than
2,400 lawyers on its books.”).
69. Dan Packel, Big Law’s Trojan Horse: Are the Big Four Preparing an Invasion?,
LAW.COM (Nov. 29, 2018, 5:00 PM), https://www.law.com/americanlawyer/2018/11/29/biglaws-trojan-horse-are-the-big-four-preparing-an-invasion/ [https://perma.cc/NMM3-JLDT].
70. See Interview with Big Four Accounting Principal, supra note 64.
71. Id.
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clients.72 Insiders estimate that their fees are roughly 30 percent lower than
those of major law firms.73
Outside the United States, CLOs are more likely to encounter direct, robust
competition for legal and advisory work among a wide range of professional
service providers: law firms, large accounting firms, legal tech companies,
and management consultancies.74 A CLO seeking legal due diligence in
India, for example, may forgo hiring a traditional law firm and engage an
ALSP.75 The shift to ALSPs abroad is not without critics. In the United
Kingdom, the potential conflicts created by bundled service offerings have
prompted proposals to spin off the Big Four’s audit functions from their other
services (e.g., legal).76 More law firms would be supplanted in the United
States if not for jurisdictional rules affecting the ownership of legal service
providers.77 Abroad, ownership requirements are less restrictive.78 Some
observers contend that the present U.S. regulatory structure impedes
innovations that might benefit American companies and their stakeholders,
and some jurisdictions are lowering ownership barriers,79 but the patchwork
of rules continues to inhibit experimentation.80 Such restrictions are often
justified as protecting the quality of professional representation.81 Critics
contend that they are actually rooted in efforts to eliminate competition for
traditional legal service providers—law firms.82 To the extent that quality
and professionalism concerns are eliminated, the justifications for restricting
ALSPs do not outweigh demand-side, value-based concerns. Notably, even
law firms employ ALSPs in serving their own corporate clients, and this
indirect use is growing in popularity.83 For example, “[m]ore than half of
large law firms use ALSPs for five or more functions, with the most common
being e-discovery, legal research, litigation and investigation support,

72. Derbyshire, supra note 68 (“Over the past decade, the accounting firms have sought
not to replicate the large law firm model but rather to refine an integrated services model that
operates at the intersection of tax, finance, consulting, strategy, information technology and
project management.”).
73. See Interview with Big Four Accounting Principal, supra note 64.
74. Wilkins & Ferrer, supra note 60, at 998–1000.
75. See Interview with Big Four Accounting Principal, supra note 64.
76. Derbyshire, supra note 68.
77. Wilkins & Ferrer, supra note 60, at 1006.
78. Id. at 998–1000.
79. See generally Andrew M. Perlman, Toward the Law of Legal Services, 37 CARDOZO
L. REV. 49 (2015).
80. See generally Wilkins & Ferrer, supra note 60, at 997–1000 (describing how the Big
Four have experimented more with alternative business structures in global jurisdictions that
are less strict about legal service provision than the United States).
81. Sam Skolnik & Amanda Iacone, Big Four May Gain Legal Market Foothold with
State Rule Change, BLOOMBERG L.: BIG L. BUS. (Apr. 11, 2019), https://biglawbusiness.com/
big-four-may-gain-legal-market-foothold-with-state-rule-change
[https://perma.cc/V58KP58L] (explaining that some lawmakers have considered these restrictions “necessary to
protect the public, by defending legal professionalism and the ability of lawyers to maintain
independence of judgment”).
82. See id.
83. ALSP REPORT, supra note 61, at 5–6.
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document review/coding, and non-legal/factual research.”84 Survey results
underscore this trend:
Around 65 percent of large law firms are using ALSPs for e-discovery
purposes, compared to 42 percent just two years ago. Half of large law
firms are currently using ALSPs for legal research, compared to just 21
percent two years ago. Non-legal and factual research was cited as a use
by 54 percent of large law firms in 2018, up from 32 percent. Litigation
and investigation support jumped to 52 percent from 33 percent, and
document review/coding is now used by 52 percent of large law firms, up
from 38 percent.85

In some instances, client corporations are pressuring law firms to make
greater use of ALSPs.86
Ironically, ALSPs can both collaborate and compete with traditional law
firms.87 The fact that corporate legal departments have significantly
increased their use of ALSPs is not surprising, but, according to a recent
survey, cost is cited as only a tertiary factor.88 According to the survey, the
primary reasons that companies use ALSPs are to access expertise they lack
in-house and to use their own resources (e.g., in-house lawyers) more
strategically and efficiently.89 Corporate legal departments are highly
unlikely to completely outsource legal functions. For cost and other reasons,
CLOs may decide to bring or keep certain functions in-house. Although
ALSPs offer an appealing option, they do not eliminate CLOs’ key makeversus-buy decisions or their professional, legal, and ethical obligations.90
Despite inroads by ALSPs, CLOs must still remain attentive to jurisdictional
restrictions and professional ethics rules.
E. Service Industry Disruption
The legal services industry is experiencing structural change and, some
observers might contend, a technological revolution—or, at a minimum,
evolution.91 AI has already displaced “Big Law” associates who once
84. Id. at 5.
85. Id. at 5–6.
86. Id. at 11.
87. Id. at 10.
88. Id. at 7–8.
89. Id.
90. Larry E. Ribstein, The Death of Big Law, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 749, 760 (“[T]he
alternative to buying outside is ‘making’ in-house—in this case by hiring in-house counsel to
provide direct legal advice and information about outside lawyers. When clients have the
technical expertise to dispense with specialists and can figure out on their own which
individual lawyers are reliable and meet their specific needs, they will have less need to buy
outside legal services based on personal relationships with individual lawyers or to rely on a
stable of ‘preferred provider’ Big Law firms. The increased role of in-house counsel is
therefore a significant threat to Big Law.”).
91. Croft, supra note 55. Such transformation is not limited to the legal services industry.
Consider transformations in other contexts and domains such as investment banking. Today,
“90 [percent] of the economic profit made in the capital-markets industry is now earned on
the buy side—that is, by those who manage assets or investments—and just 10 [percent] from
sell-side investment banking activities. A decade ago . . . that split was closer to 50-50.” A
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dedicated time to routine document review and due diligence.92 Machine
learning, which enables qualitative analysis of legal documents, such as
contracts and briefs, will have a profound impact on the legal services
market.93 Already, machines can draft briefs in a fraction of the time a law
firm associate would need94 and, as a consequence, the demand for Big Law
associates is likely to continue to wither.95 The greater availability of legal
data will drive decision-making about legal services,96 with ramifications for
litigation and deal strategies, evaluating intellectual property, improving
business processes, helping digital transformation, and delivering new
business insights in such areas as multiterritory risk assessment and
analysis.97
II. ENHANCED FINANCIAL FOCUS
The CLO role is more financially driven in today’s environment where
data-informed decision-making looms large.98 In-house legal departments
are often viewed as cost centers or non-revenue-generating corporate
functions as opposed to a revenue-generating business unit.99 However, a
broader, more accurate view recognizes the legal department’s role in
revenue generation.100 An important facet of the CLO role is to communicate
the value of the legal department to key internal and external stakeholders.101
In-house counsel provide value to shareholders by mitigating two primary
types of transaction costs: (1) costs between management and ownership and
(2) costs between the corporation and outside service providers.102

New Era at Goldman Sachs Starts in the Shadow of a Scandal, ECONOMIST (Apr. 15, 2019),
https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2019/04/15/a-new-era-at-goldmansachs-starts-in-the-shadow-of-a-scandal [https://perma.cc/YF2S-48UG].
92. Croft, supra note 55 (“[Artificial intelligence] automatically reads and extracts
relevant information from the documents under review in a fraction of the time, and more
consistently, than humans.”).
93. See Sarah Murray, Algorithms Tame Ambiguities in Use of Legal Data, FIN. TIMES
(Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/50b0eba4-d063-11e8-9a3c-5d5eac8f1ab4
[https://perma.cc/2GXQ-SQJF] (“[T]he next step is to enable machines to make qualitative
analyses of legal documents.”).
94. See Interview with Big Law Managing Partner (July 11, 2019).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See generally LEXISNEXIS MARTINDALE-HUBBELL, THE PROFITABLE LEGAL
DEPARTMENT: HOW LEGAL DEPARTMENTS CAN PROSPER BY GENERATING REVENUE FOR THEIR
COMPANY (2010), http://www.europeangc.com/uploads/Profitable%20Legal%20Department
%20Full%20report_A4_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/L5GS-DZ6L].
99. Id. at 5.
100. Id. (“It is a duty . . . for in-house legal teams to recuperate any monies due to the
corporation, outside normal duties such as dealing with labour law matters, contracts, or
regulation and compliance.”).
101. Id. at 23–24 (describing how the general counsel is responsible for convincing
stakeholders to support a legal recovery program and then proving to stakeholders that the
program is yielding positive results).
102. See Simmons & Dinnage, supra note 6, at 95–96.
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A. Transaction Costs Between Management and Ownership
CLOs and their departments figure prominently in corporate managers
satisfying their fiduciary duties (e.g., care and loyalty).103 Here, their
engagement coupled with financial acumen can help mitigate serious risks to
corporate value. In assisting their client corporations, today’s CLOs must be
conversant and comfortable with their company’s balance sheets, financial
drivers, and risks. They must also sometimes be willing to serve as a check
or counterweight to other C-suite executives such as the CEO and CFO, even
if it results in dismissal. Litigation and government investigations can bring
significant legal and financial risks. For example, in the public disclosure
context, an overly aggressive CEO or CFO may advance statements in public
securities filings (e.g., 10-K, 10-Q, etc.) that may lead to serious litigation
and reputational risks.104 Additionally, the CLO and the corporate legal
function are often crucial to corporate managers satisfying their oversight
duties—that is, implementing a system of internal controls that allows for
information flow to managers.105 The corporate compliance, sustainability,
government affairs, and other functions often report to or frequently interact
with the CLO and legal department. Thus, CLOs and corporate legal
departments loom large in addressing agency costs between managers and
shareholders in the contemporary business environment.
B. Transaction Costs Between the Corporation and Outside Service
Providers
1. Less Dependence on Big Law
With respect to the latter category of transaction costs between the
corporation and external service providers, CLOs and corporate legal
departments create and preserve value in multiple ways. In the market for
professional services, CLOs as sophisticated purchasers must consider cost,
quality, and value. In a common formulation, value is a function of cost and
quality.106 Although a service provider’s reputation can serve as a heuristic
for quality, value is not a function of service provider cost and reputation

103. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13 & cmt. (AM. BAR ASS’N
2018) (describing the CLO’s responsibility to learn of and report breaches of fiduciary duties).
104. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, NO. 353, REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES (1976)
(on file with author). The Securities and Exchange Commission found in the mid-1970s that
financial statements of companies making sensitive payments invariably were distorted to
conceal or obscure those payments. Id. at 8. This falsification “cast[s] doubt upon [a
company’s] whole system of accounting” which is an “essential component of the disclosure
system.” Id. at 6–7; see also, e.g., Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. ANZ Sec., Inc., 137 S. Ct.
2042 (2017) (discussing securities purchasers’ right of action against the issuing company or
individual for any material misstatements or omissions in disclosure statements).
105. See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369–70 (Del. 2006) (explaining managers’
oversight duties of implementing and monitoring internal company controls).
106. See Simmons & Dinnage, supra note 6, at 106–07.
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alone.107 CLOs cannot easily justify the arbitrary hiring of their former law
firm colleagues where more valuable service provider options exist. Large,
midsized, and smaller firms as well as ALSPs are all potentially valuable
service options that CLOs must consider in their value-creation role.108
Within the contemporary financially focused environment, corporate legal
departments are arguably less dependent on traditional Big Law firms.
The reasons for giving ALSPs serious consideration are also pragmatic.
Traditional large law firms may have conflicts in many areas, and the
litigation landscape has changed dramatically over the past thirty years.109
Rather than court-based litigation, today’s corporations often prefer
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) for business-to-business and consumer
disputes,110 especially in the international context.111 These factors require
a more nuanced approach to sourcing services from a mix of providers.
2. Financially Influenced Law Department Innovations
CLOs and corporate legal departments also limit transaction costs through
such practices as convergence, recovery programs, alternative billing
arrangements, and streamlining law department operations.
a. Convergence
The law firm convergence movement began when major companies, such
as DuPont and General Electric, significantly reduced the number of law
firms they engaged in order to reduce skyrocketing legal costs. Overall,
“[i]nnovations such as law firm partnering and convergence can be viewed
as attempts to extract more value from outside firms via more ongoing,
107. Id. (“[C]orporations are seeking value added beyond law firm reputation. . . . Other
components of value, such as responsiveness and cost, can make a less reputable firm more
attractive to the client corporation.”).
108. See id. at 107 (“Depending on the type of legal work involved, multiple firms may
adequately perform the task. . . . Thus, a five-star law firm may not be necessary where a
three-star firm will suffice.”).
109. See Interview with Thomas L. Sager, supra note 16.
110. See E. Norman Veasey & Grover C. Brown, An Overview of the General Counsel’s
Decision Making on Dispute-Resolution Strategies in Complex Business Transactions, 70
BUS. LAW. 407, 415 (2015) (“A key advantage of international arbitration is the relative
certainty (if all goes well in the process) of being able to enforce the award through the
available international conventions . . . .”).
111. See generally id. (providing an extensive discussion of the pros and cons of arbitration
and situational factors influencing general counsels’ decisions to litigate in courts versus
pursuing ADR). Confidentiality is one of the primary reasons arbitration is preferred over
litigation. The benefits of confidentiality include: “recurring future business with the
counterparty; secret commercial or scientific information; concerns about the company’s
reputation; not revealing certain business or litigation strategies; not upsetting customers with
a public display of problems, such as uncertain supply; and the like.” Id. at 416. The benefits
of ADR, however, can be undermined by the following: (1) a retained litigation firm
discourages ADR in pursuit of more lucrative fees; (2) executives such as the CEO and CFO
may not wish to experience disruption or dedicate the time needed to actively participate in
ADR; (3) parties’ perceived strength of their cases; (4) the risk to the CLO of obtaining an
undesirable recovery; and (5) the strength of the parties’ relationship. Id. at 416–17.
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mutually beneficial relationships that provide greater opportunities for law
firms to develop more in-depth knowledge concerning the client’s
business.”112 Notably, the convergence movement targets both the quality
and cost of legal services. It holds that, when law firms operate more as
strategic partners en route to solving the client corporation’s problems, the
client receives greater value.
b. Recovery Programs
The goal of recovery programs is to inspire greater vigilance in the
corporation’s pursuit of its rights. This might entail pursuing contractual
claims that sales personnel routinely disregard due to their perceived
insignificance, yet when properly quantified, in the aggregate, account for
serious losses. In essence, “the intent of a recoveries program is simply to
ensure that the legal department identifies and pursues those legitimate
claims that otherwise might be missed for various reasons.”113 Despite
requiring intervention and possible disruption of established business
relationships, recovery programs fall within the purview of the corporate
legal department because, “[w]hether corporate legal departments like it or
not, companies assert claims formally and informally every day, even
without a recovery program.”114 They recognize that, in the business
process, “things sometimes go wrong: services are not delivered on time,
products are shipped in a defective condition, company property is
negligently damaged by another party, warranties are breached, etc.”115
Revenue-conscious CLOs can proactively and systematically implement a
recovery program to capture opportunities that are often overlooked across
companies’ entire business operations. Doing so, they can better articulate
their value to management.
c. Alternative Fee Arrangements
Compensation functions as a mechanism to incentivize desired behavior.
Alternative billing arrangements attempt to impose greater discipline and
better incentives that ostensibly encourage service providers to deliver
greater value to corporate clients.116 Experimentation with varied fee
arrangements (e.g., fixed, formula, and performance-based), rather than
overemphasizing the billable hour, arguably discourages opportunism and
better aligns service providers and corporate clients. CLOs can optimally

112. Simmons & Dinnage, supra note 6, at 148. See generally NEW REALITY, supra note
56. DuPont was one of the first companies to take this direction and a large number of
companies have followed.
113. LEXISNEXIS MARTINDALE-HUBBELL, supra note 98, at 6.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Brown, supra note 48, at 32–33 (explaining that true cost savings, as opposed to a
discount, require general counsel to “engage in planning, scoping, and budgeting”); see also
Lamberth et al., supra note 40, at 14–15.
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employ a mixture of alternative fee arrangements customized to meet the
needs of a particular business context.
d. Streamlining Law Department Operations
Operational changes can make corporate legal departments more nimble,
efficient, and cost-effective. CLOs engage in a consistent process of
streamlining law department operations in order to meet the needs of
corporate clients. This requires, inter alia, attention to internal legal
expertise, costs, technology, and efficient deployment of personnel. For
example, corporate legal departments are developing greater process and
project management capabilities. Process management often involves
eliminating unnecessary work steps and costs,117 whereas project
management “is the application of knowledge, skills, tools, and techniques
to project activities to meet the [specific] project requirements.”118 Another
example of streamlining law department operations involves large company
law departments locating their employees in less expensive cities to control
costs and attract top talent who might be reluctant to relocate to very
expensive cities like Seattle or Palo Alto.119 For example, Oracle and Cisco
now have significant legal operations in the Research Triangle Park (RTP)
of North Carolina.120 For Cisco, RTP is its largest legal outpost outside of
Silicon Valley.121 These smaller cities bring multiple advantages: lower
costs, highly educated talent, and multiple career opportunities.
III. GLOBAL ENTERPRISE RISK-MANAGEMENT ORIENTATION
The modern CLO must have a panoramic view of business risks extending
beyond the United States.122 Lawyers are sometimes the primary interface
with new geographies and essential to discerning how to set up a business or
address ground-level regional concerns.123 Accordingly, they must sensitize
CEOs, other C-suite executives, and boards to a range of problems, legal and
extralegal.

117. See generally JEFFREY K. LIKER, THE TOYOTA WAY: 14 MANAGEMENT PRINCIPLES
FROM THE WORLD’S GREATEST MANUFACTURER (2004).
118. What Is Project Management?, PROJECT MGMT. INST., https://www.pmi.org/about/

learn-about-pmi/what-is-project-management [https://perma.cc/P8XP-E6U7] (last visited
Mar. 17, 2020).
119. See Wake Forest Law Events, Sager Speaker Series with Mark Chandler on Mar. 20,
2019, YOUTUBE (Mar. 25, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E6t0BjL5XYI
[https://perma.cc/F59K-M9TD].
120. See Interview with Thomas L. Sager, supra note 16.
121. See Wake Forest Law Events, supra note 119.
122. See Kellogg, supra note 54, at 22 (“Globalization of the legal profession is dramatic
and dynamic and will continue. As time goes on, I expect that we’ll be dealing with other
countries much the way we deal with other states.”).
123. See Yasmin Lambert, Wanted: Lawyers at Full Throttle, FIN. TIMES (May 2, 2019),
https://www.ft.com/content/c8ff241a-5f5e-11e9-b285-3acd5d43599e
[https://perma.cc/L8A7-9C3J].
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Enterprise risk management (ERM) is an overarching theme that has added
salience in today’s business environment.124 It “is an enterprise-wide attempt
to ensure that corporations address risks in the business process” and often
involves identifying, analyzing, and managing them via internal controls.125
However, legal risks are only “one subset of risks that should be incorporated
into business decisions.”126 Others may be financial, reputational,
operational, or related to human resources and brand equity.127 CLOs must
recognize not only the various types of risk but how they interact. Here,
CLOs, as insiders or “innkeepers” with intimate knowledge of business
operations, are uniquely positioned to add value. Any sound riskmanagement strategy for large companies in the contemporary context
requires a global perspective. CLOs can raise awareness and keep
management apprised of regional and cultural risks to help protect corporate
value. The following sections describe potential risks in more detail.
A. Knowledge of Global Regulatory Architecture
CLO competence includes a strong sense of the global regulatory
framework across geographical boundaries.128 From a regulatory standpoint,
CLOs must be aware of international trade laws—including tariff regimes,
sanctions, export controls, and restrictions on investment—that influence the

124. For an overview of enterprise risk management’s development, see Betty Simkins &
Steven A. Ramirez, Enterprise-Wide Risk Management and Corporate Governance, 39 LOY.
U. CHI. L.J. 571, 577–86 (2008). See also In re Citigroup, Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964
A.2d 106, 127–28 (Del. Ch. 2009) (shareholder suit alleging directors breached fiduciary
duties pursuing excessively risky strategies); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Caremark and
Enterprise Risk Management, 34 J. CORP. L. 967, 969 (2009); Kristin N. Johnson, Addressing
Gaps in the Dodd-Frank Act: Directors’ Risk Management Oversight Obligations, 45 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 55, 59 (2011) (“In the absence of rigorous ERM obligations under state
corporate law and in the wake of the recent financial crisis, Congress has taken steps to impose
federal regulation on risk management oversight. In July of 2010, Congress adopted the
[Dodd-Frank Act].”). See generally CAROLYN KAY BRANCATO ET AL., THE CONFERENCE BD.,
THE ROLE OF U.S. CORPORATE BOARDS IN ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT 10 (2006),
https://www.conference-board.org/pdfdownload.cfm?masterProductID=3840
[https://
perma.cc/UNU7-G5BM]; MATTEO TONELLO, THE CONFERENCE BD., EMERGING GOVERNANCE
PRACTICES IN ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT (2007), https://www.conference-board.org/
pdfdownload.cfm?masterProductID=1251
[https://perma.cc/46AM-M9EY]
(outlining
elements of ERM).
125. Simmons, supra note 3, at 1146; see Bainbridge, supra note 124, at 981 (“[E]nterprise
risk management can be understood as a form of agency cost control analogous to . . . law
compliance programs, and internal controls.”).
126. Simmons, supra note 3, at 1146.
127. See id.; see also Simkins & Ramirez, supra note 124, at 571 (“[Large public
corporations] face a myriad of [global] risks . . . ranging from complex financial risk to quality
control regarding material manufactured in China.”).
128. ALM INTELLIGENCE & MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP, GENERAL COUNSEL UP-ATNIGHT REPORT 5 (2018), https://media2.mofo.com/documents/170622-gc-up-at-nightreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/VF58-UKK6] (“Now, GCs must not only think globally to
maintain a culture of compliance regardless of geography, but also act locally in establishing
policies and procedures to ensure corporate action meets the prevailing local regulatory
standards.”).
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company’s domestic and foreign operations.129 For example, General
Motors sells more Buicks in China than in the United States,130 and ongoing
trade disputes with China pose a significant risk to its business.131 Even
largely domestic firms may pivot toward a more global outlook as domestic
markets mature and become saturated with their goods and services.132 This
dynamic may necessitate an expansion strategy targeting foreign markets and
channels.
B. Cultural Competence
The CLO’s global competence must go beyond a mere sense of regulatory
frameworks to encompass a keen cultural competence.133 As business
operations expand, and companies seek additional market outlets for their
products and services, the need for global, regional, and cultural sensibilities
becomes apparent.134 CLOs are selected because of their legal acumen and
because they speak the language and understand the culture of the
business.135 For example, Alexander Hamilton was DuPont’s first corporate
lawyer for these reasons; he spoke French and, most importantly, understood
the business culture.136 His effectiveness as a corporate lawyer is often
overshadowed by his other contributions.137 Hamilton’s centuries-old
example reflects the contemporary need for an expanded CLO skill set,
which includes cultural competence. Culture is like the operating system of
the corporation and, even if not readily visible to outsiders, it can have a
significant impact on risk management, compliance, and other business
outcomes.138

129. See generally June Eichbaum, Globalization and General Counsel, MINORITY CORP.
COUNS. ASS’N, https://www.mcca.com/mcca-article/globalization-and-general-counsel/
[https://perma.cc/3ZRZ-MRNE] (last visited Mar. 17, 2020) (explaining that “hands-on
experience with regulators in the European Union and in Asia” is a ‘must-have[]’ for general
counsel”).
130. See Robert Ferris, Your Grandfather’s Buick Is Hot in China, but Maybe Not for Long,
CNBC (Feb. 8, 2019, 11:18 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/02/07/why-china-is-soimportant-to-buicks-survival.html [https://perma.cc/5R2T-4FAX]; Wake Forest Law Events,
Sager Speaker Series with Craig Glidden 2/6/2018, YOUTUBE (Feb. 9, 2018),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yP7TWJUBJf8&t=151s [https://perma.cc/425J-59DU].
131. See Ferris, supra note 130.
132. Neil Kokemuller, The Disadvantage of Market Saturation, HOUS. CHRON.,
https://smallbusiness.chron.com/disadvantage-market-saturation-69967.html
[https://
perma.cc/CMK5-VBLE] (last visited Mar. 17, 2020) (“When an existing product market or
industry is saturated, your business must look to new markets, products or services to grow.”).
133. See Eichbaum, supra note 129 (“Ultimately, a global general counsel should know,
for example, enough about Islamic banking so as not to offend a client in Dubai, enough about
Indian culture so as not to ask for beef at a Mumbai restaurant, and enough about EU privacy
laws so as not to disclose protected personal data in the UK.”).
134. Id.
135. See generally TERRI MORRISON, KISS, BOW, OR SHAKE HANDS: COURTROOMS TO
CORPORATE COUNSELS (2018).
136. Tom Sager, Foreword to MORRISON, supra note 135, at xiii, xiv.
137. See id.
138. See generally Jennifer G. Hill, Legal Personhood and Liability for Flawed Corporate
Cultures (European Corp. Governance Inst. Working Paper Series in Law, Working Paper No.
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From a legal procurement perspective, CLOs must rely on a diverse
network of worldwide legal service providers, both traditional law firms and
ALSPs, and form regional teams to address ground-level business
concerns.139 They must have sufficient cultural awareness to leverage these
resources to serve corporate clients who desire cost-effective
multijurisdictional solutions.
C. The New Normal of Shareholder and Stakeholder Activism
Shareholder and stakeholder activism are the new normal.140
Consequently, a growing number of large companies have proactive and
reactive investor-engagement committees that usually report to the CEO or
CFO.141 They are often staffed with outside counsel, crisis management
professionals, consultants, and securities experts.142 While CLOs may not
frequently sit on them, they can advise the board of directors and the CEO
on how to respond to activist demands.143 As a matter of strategy, the CLO
might encourage the CEO to work through the formal investor-engagement
process with these committees to handle requests, inquiries, and
communication. The CLO’s fidelity to process can help prevent unnecessary
exploitation of executive decision-making.144
Recent statements by the Business Roundtable, the former chief justice of
the Delaware Supreme Court, and other corporate influencers highlight the
growing acceptance and consideration of broader stakeholder interests versus

413/2018, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3309697 [https://
perma.cc/YWL2-D6UB].
139. Kellogg, supra note 54, at 22–23 (“Big Law firms have established outposts and
expanded their networks to better serve international clients . . . the ‘global legal market is
becoming extremely competitive and, in some markets, over-crowded.’”).
140. See generally Lisa M. Fairfax, From Apathy to Activism: The Emergence, Impact,
and Future of Shareholder Activism as the New Corporate Governance Norm, 99 B.U. L. REV.
1301, 1314 (2019).
141. Matteo Tonello & Matteo Gatti, Board-Shareholder Engagement Practices, HARV. L.
SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Dec. 30, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/
12/30/board-shareholder-engagement-practices/ [https://perma.cc/3TP3-X6NE] (“Sixty
percent or more of the largest companies involve their general counsel in board exchanges
with investors.”).
142. See generally Business Roundtable, Principles of Corporate Governance, HARV. L.
SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Sept. 8, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/
2016/09/08/principles-of-corporate-governance/ [https://perma.cc/3SY9-N5PS].
143. David Ruiz, 4 Tips for General Counsel Dealing with Shareholder Activists, LAW.COM
(Aug.
14,
2017,
12:00
AM),
https://www.law.com/insidecounsel/almID/
59925767140ba0fd4186ad16/ [https://perma.cc/GP8F-739P] (explaining that general counsel
should explain to the board how to appropriately communicate with shareholder activists); see
also Interview with Thomas L. Sager, supra note 16.
144. Interview with Thomas L. Sager, supra note 16; see MATTEO TONELLO & MATTEO
GATTI, BOARD-SHAREHOLDER ENGAGEMENT PRACTICES: FINDINGS FROM A SURVEY OF SECREGISTERED
COMPANIES
42–43
(2019),
https://www.conference-board.org/
pdfdownload.cfm?masterProductID=20347 [https://perma.cc/L35V-EAEP] (illustrating the
positive correlation between a company’s annual revenue and its expectation that the CLO
meet with directors prior to the engagement with shareholders to discuss legal restraints of
specific agenda items).
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a narrow focus on shareholder primacy.145 In this climate, corporations are
assessing their environmental, social, and governance (ESG) profiles and
considering the related risks alongside other traditional performance
metrics.146 CLOs must advise corporate managers to consider how ESG
factors fit into the business strategy and help them respond to pleas to engage
from impact investors and other stakeholders including the public.147 In the
ESG- and stakeholder-focused context, the role of the CLO is likely elevated.
In the wake of the Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank Acts, the CFO role rose
in prominence. But the shift toward a stakeholder focus might signal a shift
toward an enhanced CLO role because of the strong connection between ESG
and corporate operations (e.g., supply chains).148
D. Succession as the CLO’s Role and Legacy
Risks to corporate value are immediate, short term, and long term. And
CLOs must be concerned with the continuity of quality legal support and
advice for the client corporation during and after their tenure. This continuity
extends to the entire legal department. CLOs need not view their immediate
reports as successors but, ideally, facilitate and promote a talent development
program throughout the legal organization.149 Without such a program,
corporations are assuming avoidable risks. A lack of succession planning for
the legal department and other key corporate functions reflects suboptimal
145. See Business Roundtable, supra note 15; see also Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward Fair and
Sustainable Capitalism: A Comprehensive Proposal to Help American Workers, Restore Fair
Gainsharing Between Employees and Shareholders, and Increase American Competitiveness
by Reorienting Our Corporate Governance System Toward Sustainable Long-Term Growth
and Encouraging Investments in America’s Future (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch. Inst. for Law &
Econ., Research Paper No. 19-39, 2019), https://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/
Fair%20and%20Sustainable%20Capitalism%20Proposal%20-%20White%20Paper_
09.26.19%20FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/HW6T-G5JT]; Tett, supra note 15. In April 2019,
the Conference Board rebranded its Governance Center as the ESG Center, recognizing the
importance of strategic, integrated ESG practices. See TONELLO & GATTI, supra note 144.
146. TONELLO & GATTI, supra note 144, at 2 (“Once the sole purview of fringe, sociallyresponsible investors (SRI), issues of sustainability and corporate social responsibility have
recently gone mainstream and found the endorsement of large mutual funds.”).
147. Veena Ramani, Environmental, Social, and Governance (“ESG”) Issues Pose Risks
to Companies. Can Chief Legal Officers Help Drive Solutions?, ASS’N CORP. COUNS. (Nov.
6 2019), https://www.acc.com/resource-library/environmental-social-and-governance-esgissues-pose-risks-companies-can-chief-0 [https://perma.cc/9JRK-W44W].
148. Id. (“In 2018, investors filed nearly 400 shareholder resolutions on sustainability
issues, many of them related to climate change.”). See generally PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE
INV., FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE OF ESG INTEGRATION IN US INVESTING (2018),
https://www.unpri.org/download?ac=4218 [https://perma.cc/F3YM-DVXG] (demonstrating
how directing corporate attention to climate change and other social issues delivers higher
stock returns and lower capital costs and volatility risks); Tamas Barko et al., Shareholder
Engagement on Environmental, Social, and Governance Performance (European Corp.
Governance Inst. Working Paper Series in Fin., Working Paper No. 509/2017, 2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2977219
[https://perma.cc/AFP7XFTR].
149. Neil Amato, Poor Talent Management Hinders Companies’ Growth, Innovation, FIN.
MGMT. (Sept. 18, 2012), https://www.fm-magazine.com/news/2012/sep/20126410.html
[https://perma.cc/4YCS-QKXW].
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risk management and, for some commentators, is an example of
organizational failure.150 Admittedly, short-term incentives may impede
succession planning. CLOs may be overwhelmed by rigorous short-term
demands, that is, “putting out fires.” But CLOs and the client corporation
should aspire to address succession-related risks for the entire corporate legal
department.
IV. CHALLENGES
There are multiple challenges to CLOs effectively executing their
enhanced value-creating role. This effectiveness is impacted by multiple
factors, especially: (1) a shared understanding between management and
CLOs as to the latter’s role and (2) lawyer competence.151
A. Shared Understanding Between Management and CLOs of the CLO
Role
Structure matters. It signals authority and limitations.152 Corporate
reporting structures should allow for CLOs’ strategic engagement with
management and other constituencies. To achieve this, CLOs “must report
to the board of directors or, at least, the CEO” because “[a]nything less than
this will inhibit the functioning of the value-creation attributes that are vital
to in-house counsel effectiveness.”153 Ideally, the CLO should have dual
reporting lines to the board of directors and the CEO. Alternative reporting
structures where CLOs report to CFOs and other non-CEO C-suite members
could constrain the ability of CLOs to address important risks.154 There is
an ongoing tension among C-suite executives. In recent years, CFOs have
wielded significant power. Yet the emergence of the CLO in the
contemporary environment could be perceived as a threat to other C-suite
members who may harbor profoundly different views toward risk

150. See Eben Harrell, Succession Planning: What the Research Says, HARV. BUS. REV.
(Dec. 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/12/succession-planning-what-the-research-says [https://
perma.cc/K3PC-KGZM].
151. Simmons & Dinnage, supra note 6, at 146.
152. See Veta T. Richardson & Liesbeth De Ridder, Including General Counsel Could
Prevent Scandal, ASS’N CORP. COUNS., https://www2.acc.com/governance/ridder/ [https://
perma.cc/U7QZ-UBZQ] (last visited Mar. 17, 2020).
153. Simmons & Dinnage, supra note 6, at 146; see Sue Reisinger, Talk to Me: Bank of
America GC Now Reports to CEO as Part of Shake-Up, LAW.COM (Jan. 14, 2010, 12:00 AM),
http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1202437913504&Talk_to_Me_Bank_of_
America_GC_Now_Reports_to_CEO_as_Part_of_ShakeUp
[https://perma.cc/D3DVVLAB] (describing a situation where it was important for the general counsel to report to the
CEO).
154. See Richardson & De Ridder, supra note 152; see also Sean J. Griffith, Corporate
Governance in an Era of Compliance, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2075, 2082 n.12 (2016)
(noting that the five most commonly listed compliance responsibilities are “compliance
training,” “code of conduct,” “whistleblower programs,” “compliance with domestic
regulations,” and “compliance strategy & process,” and the five least commonly listed chief
compliance officer responsibilities are “regulatory filings,” “regulatory relationship
management,” “records management,” “culture assessment,” and “business continuity”).
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management, compliance, and professional ethics.155 Understandably, the
enhanced strategic CLO role demands greater C-suite prominence and
management endorsement.
B. CLO Competence: The T-shaped Lawyer
CLO competence matters. The CLO of the future should have a skill set
that resembles a T.156 Here, the vertical line represents acute legal acumen
and the horizontal line represents additional competencies (e.g.,
procurement, finance, global enterprise risk management, technology,
cultural savvy) that allow a lawyer to bridge multiple constituencies.157
CLOs must behave and be “perceived to behave in ways that justify their
Their professional competence extends beyond legal
presence.”158
knowledge and technical skills: it includes a fidelity to ethics and
professional responsibility.
Despite a heightened business focus, the enhanced CLO role advanced in
this Essay remains consistent with legal ethics and lawyer professional
identity. CLOs provide unique value to the corporation due in significant
part to their legal identity and commitments to the profession. Thus, CLOs
should remain lawyers, not professionals simply performing legal tasks.
Ronald Gilson once asserted, “For those concerned about the future of the
professional project, the growing prominence of inside counsel within the
profession, reflecting their market power, is not a threat but an opportunity,
perhaps our only one.”159 The emergence of CLOs in the contemporary
environment, if approached properly, has the potential to elevate both
corporations and the legal profession.
CONCLUSION
The dynamic and rapidly shifting contemporary global business
environment requires an enhanced CLO role with a deeper set of
competencies. They include, inter alia, (1) sophisticated procurement
capabilities, (2) an enhanced financial focus, and (3) a global enterprise riskmanagement orientation. Given their expanded skill set, contemporary
CLOs can be more potent corporate officers creating value for the
corporation and fulfilling an internal quasi-regulatory function benefiting
multiple stakeholders.
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